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Abstract
When anxious or depressed people try to recall emotionally ambiguous events, they produce errors that reflect their habits of
interpreting ambiguity in negative ways. These distortions are revealed by experiments that evaluate performance on memory
tasks after taking interpretation biases into account—an alternative to the standard memory-bias procedure that examines the
accuracy of memory for clearly emotional material. To help establish the causal role of interpretation bias in generating memory
bias, these distortions have been simulated by training interpretation biases in nondisordered groups. The practical implications of
these findings for therapeutic intervention are discussed; future directions are described.
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It is fitting to speak of every human cognitive reaction—
perceiving, imagining, remembering, thinking and reasoning—
as an effort after meaning.
Sir Frederick Bartlett (1932, p. 44)

When cognitive psychologists rediscovered Bartlett’s work in
the 1970s, they were not concerned about the implications of his
writing for cognitive phenomena associated with anxiety and
depression. And even though the past four decades have seen
a steady stream of articles on constructive and reconstructive
memory errors, memory experiments conducted with emotionally disordered samples have continued to emphasize accuracy,
mainly by measuring how many emotionally positive or negative events are remembered by depressed and anxious research
participants, compared to controls. Research on false memories
of sexual abuse constitutes one notable exception (see McNally
& Geraerts, 2009). More mundane instances of memory distortions are the topic of our research, however, and perhaps there is
nothing more mundane than the occurrence of ambiguity. Other
people’s faces, words, and actions invite ‘‘effort after meaning’’—interpretations that tend to be more emotionally negative
if made by anxious and depressed individuals (see the review by
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). These cognitive habits of interpreting ambiguous events in negative ways provide the basis for
distortions when the events are brought to mind subsequently.
Sometimes veiled by other research methods, negative memory
biases emerge when errors in remembering are examined for evidence of effort after meaning.

Cognitive Habits in Anxiety
Most anxiety disorders are typified by negatively biased
attention and interpretation (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
Potentially threatening events capture and hold the attention
of anxious people more readily than do nonthreatening events.
Ambiguous events are interpreted as posing threats. In contrast
to these consistent findings, many reviews of the literature find
little evidence for memory biases (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews,
2004), although there are a few such reports, and a close look
suggests a connection between interpretation and recall. In one
example, autobiographical recall showed a negative bias when
the memories were rated for emotional meaning by the anxious
participants themselves but not when they were rated by
independent judges (Burke & Mathews, 1992). More generally,
evidence for memory bias can be difficult to detect in
autobiographical reports, because the meaning of ambiguous
events might seem benign to independent raters but threatening
to those who experienced them. These possibilities encouraged
us to conduct laboratory experiments designed to reveal the
dependence of memory bias on interpretation bias.
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Table 1. Invented Endings and Later Recall of Club Scenario1 by a Control Participant and an Anxious Participant
Response type

Control participant response

Anxious participant response

Invented ending

I nod as a form of greeting, sit down quietly, and wait for
the conversation to begin again.
While approaching the door, I hear loud conversation.
When I enter the room, however, the conversation
ends.
I sit down and wait for the conversation to begin again,
and nod to the people there as a form of introduction.

I guess I look pretty weird in the club. I’m not the typical
person you’d find at a club.
When I come in, they all stop and stare at me.

Scenario recall

Ending recall

I guess it looks like I don’t belong in a club.

Note. 1Scenario was: You are invited to attend a social at a local club, whose members you don’t know very well. As you approach the door you hear loud conversation. When you enter the room, it stops. (Scenario from Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000.)
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In Experiment 1 of this effort (Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann,
& Gotlib, 2008), individuals diagnosed with generalized social
phobia and controls recruited from the local community first
imagined themselves as participants in various emotionally
ambiguous social scenarios that could be interpreted in negative or threatening ways. After reading each scenario, they
invented an ending, and these endings often reflected their resolution of the ambiguity. Table 1 contains an example of one
scenario, together with endings produced by a nondisordered
participant and by an anxious participant. Later, we requested
recall of each scenario in response to the title and first sentence
(and, separately, recall of the self-produced ending). As shown
in Figure 1, the anxious participants produced a certain kind of
error in recalling the scenarios: distortions that incorporated the
meaning of their previous, emotionally negative endings.
(In the example, the anxious participant recalled reading that,
upon entering a local club, the members stopped to stare at him
or her.) As is typical, the anxious participants had actually
produced more negative interpretations than had the controls
(e.g., ‘‘I guess I look pretty weird . . . ’’). Therefore, researchers
who are accustomed to thinking in terms of accuracy might
view the recall results as having been confounded by differential availability of negative interpretations. The Bartlettian constructivist agrees, because differential availability is actually
the point. What socially anxious people recall about ambiguous
social events is indeed a result of interpretation bias.
In addition to the availability of negative interpretations,
other factors possibly contribute to the production of
interpretation-based memory distortions in social anxiety.
First, consider the possibility that the anxious participants
failed to focus sufficiently on the details of the anxietyprovoking scenarios and later confabulated in attempting to
comply with instructions to recall. This possibility is unsupported, because anxious and control participants recalled the
same percentage of ideas from the original scenarios, on average, and because overall intrusions in recall were actually
(although nonsignificantly) more frequent in the control group.
A second possibility is that imagery processes exacerbate the
difficulties in isolating memory for the description of the scenario from memory for one’s interpretation (source monitoring
confusions; see Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). To address this
possibility in Experiment 2, we recruited university students
who scored low or high on a self-report measure of social
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Fig. 1. Mean percentage of recall errors that corresponded to
the meaning of the participant-provided endings (distortions)
for anxious versus control participants, distributed according to
the emotional valence (socially anxious, otherwise negative,
neutral, or positive) of the endings. An error was counted when
new meaning was added during scenario recall (Hertel,
Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008, Experiment 1).

anxiety. We gave them the same task that we used in
Experiment 1, with two exceptions: Instead of asking participants to construct endings, we provided negative endings that
had been produced by anxious participants in Experiment 1;
and we varied instructions for reading the scenarios and endings. In an imagery condition, the students tried to imagine
themselves in the situations and rated the vividness of each
image; in the closure condition, they considered and rated the
degree to which each ending provided closure to the scenario.
As seen in Figure 2, nonanxious students who performed the
more abstract closure task made fewer distortions based on the
negative scenario endings. Together with the previous results,
these results suggest that distortions arise from the combination
of available negative interpretations and self-involving imagery, operating even for nonanxious students who happen to
have negative interpretations at hand and self-focused
imaginations.
There is good reason to believe that the anxious students in
the closure condition, in spite of their instructions, responded
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Fig. 2. Mean percentage of recall errors reflecting the meaning
of experiment-provided, emotionally negative endings. Students
categorized as low or high on a self-report of social anxiety
read each scenario either by imagining themselves as the main
actor or by deciding whether the ending provided closure to
the scenario (Hertel et al., 2008, Experiment 2).

habitually by imagining themselves in the anxiety-provoking
situations. Negative self-focused images and interpretations
characterize social anxiety (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews,
2006), and it is a combination of these habits that likely
leads to memory distortions of the sort that we found in
Experiment 1.

Simulations
Subsequent experiments have used a methodology called cognitive bias modification of interpretation (CBM-I) to simulate the
interpretive biases found in naturally occurring emotional disorders. In a typical version of CBM-I (see Mathews & Mackintosh,
2000), nondisordered volunteers undergo a training phase, consisting of many episodes of interpreting emotionally ambiguous
events. The task performed while reading about these episodes
encourages either predominantly positive or predominantly negative interpretations, and there are built-in checks for the success
of the training. In brief, each scenario is emotionally ambiguous
until the very last word, which is presented as a fragment; in
completing the fragment the participant disambiguates the scenario in a threatening or benign direction. Subsequently, the participants perform a new task, selected to reveal the effects of the
bias. In experiments described in this report, the transfer task is
one in which we can examine memory distortions of the sort we
found for social anxiety. These simulations are important
because the experimental manipulation of bias permits causal
statements about the effects of interpretation bias—merely measured in anxious samples—on memory for ambiguous events, or
more generally on other behaviors, mood states, and even the
tendency to develop emotional disorders.
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Fig. 3. Mean rating for the emotional valence of the
scenario endings constructed before and recalled
after training a positive or negative interpretation bias
(CBM-I). Ratings could range from –1 (negative) to 1
(positive). The positive training condition produced
significant change across phases (Salemink, Hertel, &
Mackintosh, in press).

In an experiment by Tran, Hertel, and Joormann (2009), the
student volunteers experienced 100 episodes of positive or negative CBM-I. Then they read 20 entirely ambiguous scenarios
and rated the degree of similarity between the meaning of each
scenario and both positive and negative statements expressing
possible interpretations. This task was used to establish the success of interpretation training (see Mathews & Mackintosh,
2000). Finally, the titles of the 20 ambiguous scenarios were
used as cues for recalling the scenarios. Independent raters
decided whether each recalled scenario contained a distortion
of meaning. When it did, they categorized the distortion as
emotionally positive, neutral, or negative. As predicted, the
pattern of these distortions was congruent with the valence of
their training. Positive training produced more positive distortions, similar numbers of neutral distortions, and fewer negative distortions compared to negative training.
The outcome in the experiment by Tran et al. (2009) can be
understood as proactive interference of trained interpretation
on memory for the scenario, because CBM-I occurred prior
to the event to be recalled, much in the same way as the development of an anxiety disorder occurs prior to events that are
experienced as threatening by socially anxious individuals.
From the perspective of interference paradigms, it is interesting
to consider the possibility of retroactive effects of CBM-I,
which can be seen as analogous to the question of whether a
recently developed anxiety disorder can affect memory for
events that occurred previously. If initial interpretation bias is
essential to the memory distortion, then we should not expect
retroactive effects. Indeed, Salemink, Hertel, and Mackintosh
(in press) failed to find such evidence when they interjected
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Cognitive Habits in Depression
Memory biases in depression are among the best-established
phenomena in clinical cognition (see Mathews & MacLeod,
2005). Emotionally negative events are better recalled by
depressed people and positive events are less well recalled, compared to controls, especially following self-referential judgments
made about the material. Moreover, this pattern of accuracy is
consistent with the well-documented habit of rumination about
negative events related to the self (e.g., Lyubormirsky, Caldwell,
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). To capture the relations among
rumination, interpretation bias, and subsequent recall, Hertel and
El-Messidi (2006) recruited dysphoric and nondysphoric college
students and asked them to perform a series of tasks. First,
Nolen-Hoeksema’s thought-induction task was used to establish
a ruminative pattern of thinking in one condition (self-focused)
and a distracting pattern in another (other-focused). Following
bogus tasks to disguise the purpose of the experiment, the experimenter asked participants if they could spare a few more minutes
to freely associate to words in a pilot study. Among the words
were homographs with personal and impersonal meanings
(e.g., ‘‘blue,’’ ‘‘stable,’’ ‘‘bitter’’), and the speeded responses
indicated the direction of interpretation (e.g., sad vs. green in
response to ‘‘blue’’). Finally, participants were asked to recall
the cues for free association. El-Messidi scored the percentage
of homographs recalled according to whether they had been
interpreted personally or impersonally. Recall of impersonally
interpreted homographs did not differ according to dysphoria
or the thought-induction condition. But recall of personally interpreted homographs benefited from prior rumination and only in
the dysphoric group (see Fig. 4). If interpretations are not taken
into account, this consequence of rumination goes unnoticed.
Ruminative thinking produces other effects such as the elevation
of negative mood and increased recall of negative autobiographical memories—the latter perhaps aided by interpretation bias—
in depressed samples only (Lyubormirsky et al., 1998). Thus, the
cognitive habit of rumination has special consequences for memory in depression.
An experiment that comes close to examining depressionrelated distortions in memory as a consequence of
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CBM-I between initial exposure to ambiguous scenarios and a
subsequent test of scenario recall. On the other hand, these participants misremembered the scenario endings that they constructed in the first phase; they remembered them as having
been positive or negative as a function of their CBM-I training
condition (see Fig. 3).1 And because the remembered interpretations showed emotion-related distortions, we might expect
that subsequently repeated attempts to remember the scenarios
could be distorted in ways that are reminiscent of Bartlett’s
evidence of reconstructive memory from the method of repeated
reproduction. Each recall attempt itself is a new ‘‘presentation’’
of the scenario, and this new presentation would occur together
with the biased memory for the ending; later attempts to recall
might thereby produce evidence of interpretation-based distortion. This possibility awaits empirical support.
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Fig. 4. Mean percentage of homographs recalled when the
homographs had been previously interpreted to have personal
meaning. Means are presented according to the condition of
dysphoria and according to whether the thought-induction task
at the outset of the session had been self-focused or otherfocused. Percentages recalled when the homographs had been
interpreted impersonally did not differ significantly according to
presence or absence of dysphoria or according to type of
thought induction (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006).

interpretation biases was reported recently by Joormann,
Teachman, and Gotlib (2009). These investigators found higher
levels of false recall of emotionally negative concepts in a
group of participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Participants falsely recalled nonpresented lures that were
associated with presented words in the same conceptual category. According to our analysis, a ruminative habit should
exaggerate this sort of evidence of false recall, and the
thought-induction procedures invented by Nolen-Hoeksema
and her colleagues offer a method for investigating this possibility. Because they direct thought patterns in ways that mimic
naturally occurring rumination but permit conclusions about
the effects of habit on subsequent tasks, thought-induction procedures have a lot in common with CBM procedures.

Future Directions and Clinical Implications
Most CBM-I research is conducted under the assumption that a
habit is being trained and that, upon the occurrence of future
ambiguous episodes, the research participant simply and without any special awareness responds automatically in the
new habitual way. Clearly, this ‘‘transfer’’ performance itself
recruits memory processes, and an important question is
whether memory operates in the sort of automatic or habitual
way typically assumed or whether the individual consciously
considers similar past experience during the transfer task. Some
of our current research uses the process-dissociation procedure
(Jacoby, 1991) to estimate the separate contributions of automatic and consciously controlled processes to performance in
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CBM-I transfer tasks. Knowing about the basis of the transfer
has important implications for clinical application.
More generally, knowing about the causal status of cognitive habits makes it possible to propose treatment plans, considered by some researchers to be the ultimate goal of CBM
investigations (see MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). Individuals with negative interpretation biases should benefit from
CBM-I programs that are relevant to their idiosyncratic concerns. Repeated sessions of CBM-I training has reduced social
anxiety (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008), and this technique
might be particularly helpful for clients who resist exposures
in therapy. More relevant to our concerns, however, is the
possibility that training efforts can facilitate neutral or positive
memories by avoiding distortions related to naturally occurring
biases. During cognitive behavioral therapy, clients are encouraged to use benign memories as evidence when they generate
prospective thoughts and engage in proactive behaviors. In this
regard, it seems important to understand the degree to which
habit or reflection or both are responsible for transfer effects.
Reliance on controlled reflection is ill advised for some emotional disorders (e.g., depression). In fact, concerns about
deficits in cognitive control suggest that future efforts should
also be focused on the training of source discrimination—the
practice in telling the difference between an actual experience
and one’s own interpretation of that experience (see Mitchell &
Johnson, 2009).
In conclusion, we note that a habit-oriented approach to
understanding memory and other cognitive phenomena associated with emotional disorders might be more informative in the
long run than are traditional diagnostic procedures. Various
emotional disorders have similar patterns of dysfunctional cognitive habits that often can be treated in similar ways. Indeed,
Barlow and colleagues (Allen, McHugh, & Barlow, 2008) have
begun implementing a ‘‘unified treatment protocol’’ for emotional disorders to address common patterns of thoughts and
behaviors across disorders. To the list of accruing similarities
between anxiety and depression, our research suggests the
addition of memory distortions that reflect individual habits
of thought.
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Note
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